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However, it is not, I concluded, by Diogenes. Writing at the same time, A. Laks, who knows the thought of Diogenes better than anyone, pointed out an important divergence between Diogenes' system and that of the papyrus. Its author follows the pluralism of Anaxagoras in thinking that the things that are exist independently of Mind, whereas Diogenes is a monist who holds that they are all modifications of a single primary substance, Air/ Mind: "Air becomes the place where things evolve, rather than their 'substance' ... Diogenes denies the absolute separation of Anaxagoras' intelligence in order to explain its capacity to act upon the other things: Intelligence is air's intelligence. But since all things are but modifications of air, this amounts to endorsing total immanence and hence sacrificing the transcendence of the first principle.... The acceptance of an Anaxagorean-like pluralism by the Derveni author goes together with a conception of divine air that makes it the place of everything (including, in some special sense, of intelligence), thus paradoxically preserving its transcendent status."12 I shall return to these questions after considering the author's attitude to mystery cult and its sacred texts. Its author probably pursued a purpose very similar to that of Heraclitus of Ephesus, while of course modernizing the philosophical doctrines by which he offered a "scientific" interpretation of rituals and sacred texts. Heraclitus derides traditional worship and mystery religion as mere ignorance.13 In both style and content, Heraclitus is profoundly influenced by the mysteries,14 and yet scorns both ordinary people and the religious establishment, and is ready to equate gods with each other in the case of Hades and Dionysus. Both moves are paralleled in our text. Consider the following fragments of Heraclitus' book (the second in a citation by Clement): "They are purified by being polluted with alien blood, just as if one washed by stepping into mud ... They pray to statues, as if someone were to converse with houses, not understanding what gods or heroes are." "For whom does Heraclitus prophesy? 'For night-rangers: magoi, bacchoi, maenads, initiates.' For these he threatens what happens after death, for these he prophesies the fire; for 'the mysteries that are customarily performed among men are practiced in an unholy manner."' "Were they not making a procession for Dionysus and singing a hymn to reverend things (aidoia, i.e., phalloi), they would be acting with utter irreverence. Hades and Dionysus, for whom they rave in madness, are the same."15 It is no coincidence that the Derveni papyrus cites Heraclitus, I believe, twice: not only at column IV 8-10, but also at XI 8-9, an otherwise unattested fragment where his name is not given.
As W. K. C. Guthrie wrote, "Heraclitus was not hostile to initiations and Dionysiac orgia as such, but deplored the fact that they were carried out without any understanding of their true significance."16 In just the same way the papyrus claims that the ordinary person, even when initiated, does not understand; he does not know, for instance, that all the different gods who are worshipped are one, namely Zeus, who is also Air and permeates all creation (cols. XVI-XIX); or, again, that evil spirits and the Furies are vengeful souls (cols. II, VI). The Derveni author is certain that he can decode all the riddles, whether those of ritual in the opening columns or those in the poem of Orpheus, who, he insists, conceals in his verses not "unbelievable riddles, but important truths in riddles," which are aimed at only the few, not the many (col. VII); on the other hand, people undergoing initiation cannot even hear and understand at the same time (col. XX). Heraclitus presents even his own logos as hard and riddling for ordinary people to understand, demanding a similar decoding: "people always fail to understand this discourse, both before they hear it and when they first hear it" (DK 22 B 1). M. L. West has noted the oddity that the Derveni text combines a physical system of Ionian type with a "less rationalistic kind of concern with religious enlightenment."17 He boldly drew from this several deductions, which are, I believe, all correct: (1) "it was these religious interests that led to his acquaintance with the Orphic poem"; (2) "he was himself one of the initiates whose ritual acts he knows and interprets"; (3) "the Orphic poem may have been a sacred text of theirs, and likewise 'the Hymns' from which he quotes at one point";18 and (4) "perhaps he was writing for them, to introduce them to a Diogenean cosmology in which he had been instructed elsewhere." Thus the author was no ordinary follower of the Orphic movement, but a highly sophisticated one and a schismatic as well.19 Indeed, Orphics, religious experts, and sophists were overlapping categories at this date: the author appears to be at once a sophistical Orphic and an Orphic sophist. What is most remarkable about him is the extraordinary mixture of piety and science; as Guthrie concluded, allegorical interpretation was an important part of the Orphic approach from an early date, even before Plato's dismissive reference to the allegorical interpretation of improper myths about the gods, such as are fit to be revealed only during the mysteries (Resp. 3 378a-d). 20 Scholars have rarely considered the likely effect on public opinion of such an interpretation, which sought to reconcile traditional religious belief and practice with the latest scientific progress.21 Listeners receptive to the author's undertaking might well wonder whether they needed to go to all the trouble and expense of becoming initiated. The more literal-minded (or, we might say, "fundamentalist") among them may not have appreciated such "enlightened" views at all; and the priests, who had a real financial interest in the maintenance of a numerous clientele, might take a very dim view indeed. Two generations earlier, Heraclitus could apparently express such opinions without fear, but later in the fifth century hostility to the new religious enlightenment was profound and widespread in Athens, despite modern attempts to minimize the evidence. This hostility is depicted by Plutarch in his Life of Nicias (23.2-3):
The first man to put in writing the clearest and boldest of all doctrines about the changing phases of the moon was Anaxagoras. But he was no ancient authority, nor was his doctrine in high repute. (DK 85 B 7) . The same sense is given by the title of Ion of Chios' cosmological prose work Tptayjoi, in which Ion, who died shortly before 421, claimed that Pythagoras composed the icpo6; X6yo ascribed to Orpheus (Orph. frag. T 248 Kern); this title derives from zptidco "throw down thrice, win," because in wrestling, the fighter who was thrown to the ground three times lost. It is possible that all these works were named after throws in that sport, although Dtinpp3dkkiv is unattested in this sense, and danonipyiEtiv is wholly unknown; perhaps it meant "throw from a great height as from a tower," a hold in which the victim is lifted high up before being tossed to the ground. However, it might signify "Fortifying arguments" or "Wallingoff arguments," in a metaphor from the siegecraft so prevalent during the Peloponnesian War; or, since the Suda cites the title under its entry nup7YiKOt, the name for a piece of furniture like a "chest," it is also possible that it denotes a work that had to be kept in a metaphorical "casket" and that circulated only in secret, just as Plutarch claims that works on natural science became d76pprTzot (Nic. 23.2).
Whatever isolated incident. Diodorus states simply that he was driven out "while these things were going on," that is, the religious turmoil of 415/4 generally. But he adds that Diagoras "the so-called a(0so was slandered for impiety and feared the people," thus evincing skepticism about the accusation that he was actually impious.35 His doubt is in itself significant, since it implies that Diodorus, or his source, had information about Diagoras' beliefs, and that these were not therefore particularly hard to ascertain. He does not place him among those who performed parodies of the Mysteries. Diagoras was never tried, but was condemned by a vote of the Assembly-an action redolent of the hysteria of 415, which even led to a lifting of the ban on torturing citizens (Andoc. De mysteriis 43). He could not have been included in the proceedings against the "profaners" of the Mysteries, because, as a metic, he could not have owned real property that could be confiscated like that of Athenians accused of this offense. One of the latter, Andocides, is explicitly compared with Diagoras by his prosecutor in 400/399, but with the difference that, whereas the latter profaned the Mysteries "in word," Andocides did so "in deed."36 Since the speaker continues by arguing that the accused showed the Greeks that he "does not believe in gods," he clearly expects the jury to accept that Diagoras was an aicos. The Diogenean "heresy" was peculiarly liable to be understood as "atheism," since Diogenes equated God with a material principle, Air, as does the papyrus. So did Diagoras of Melos, since Aristophanes quips that Socrates "the Melian" thought Zeus had been deposed by "Dinos" (Mr. Vortex).50 Indeed, the Socrates of the Clouds presents his novel doctrines as a great mystery into which his pupils must be initiated. On this evidence, and that of Plato's Phaedo 97b-98b, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, at some time before or during the late 420s, Socrates too accepted a teleological adaptation of the doctrines of Anaxagoras, and that this former belief played a part in his condemnation.5 K. J. Dover has argued against the Athenians' persecution of other intellectuals, holding that the condemnation 49. So Parker, Athenian Religion, p. 211 with n. 48; but he is right to note that the issue is raised "to stress the division between true Socratic piety and the traditional version, in fact impious, that has presumed to arraign him ... The truly dangerous innovators in religion ... are soi-disant experts such as Euthyphro." Numenius already took the passage to mean that Plato, wishing to criticize scandalous stories about the gods but afraid of being executed like Socrates, ridiculed them by making the laughable theologian (we might say "religious fanatic") Euthyphro accept them (frag. 23 Des Places). Euthyphro was, of course, an exponent of etymology, as we learn in the Cratylus (396d, 399a, 399e) of Socrates was an isolated event.52 However, even if some of the tales of court cases are contradictory and unreliable, there remains enough evidence to show that an anti-intellectual climate existed and was focused on "atheism"; any reader of the Clouds with a sense of humor will find it difficult not to take its ending very seriously.
The reasons why certain intellectuals felt the cold winds of popular hostility were varied, of course, but fear of "atheism" will have been a paramount factor. Some of Socrates' jury certainly condemned him for political motives;53 thus the moderate politician Anytus probably prosecuted him as a Laconizing pro-oligarch and menace to the restored democracy, whose sophistical teachings corrupted the youth (cf. P1. Meno 91c-92b); Aeschines says flatly that he was condemned because he had educated Critias Thus it has often seemed unclear when to render 65 as "but" and when to ignore it. The author does not follow the usual later forms of constructions like "not only ... but also." He also appears to be writing in an unfamiliar genre; not only the commentary, but prose itself, seems to come to him only with difficulty. He often omits the definite article where later prose would employ it, and rarely uses it to mark words that we would put between quotation marks; this has caused confusion. So has a failure always to recognize when he is using X70iy with the sense "mean" rather than "say," and oTcCOS as "that," as in Herodotus, rather than "how." For the English to read intelligibly, we also need on occasion to translate as pluperfects not only aorists in subordinate clauses but even the past tense of siLi, and to supply punctuation and quotation marks freely and skillfully. My hypothesis that there is only one god in this system has sometimes led me to translate verbs describing deity with a masculine pronoun even when a feminine seems called for (e.g., in col. XVIII); similar problems confront translators of Gnostic texts. I have attempted to render the sense of participles (i.e., causal, conditional, or whatever), rather than leave their nuances indeterminate as the text so often does. The use of singular verbs with neuter plural subjects has led to mistranslations, and some counter-to-fact conditionals letter lost in a lacuna, La, a letter restored from a quotation elsewhere, {a}  a deletion by an editor, and (a) a letter added 73. -r6Tr must mean "destiny" rather than "random chance," reflecting the outcome of the divine plan. ("Voicing all things" means "teaching all things." For "voice" and "utterance" are the same thing, to "voice" means the same as to "utter," and to "utter" means the same)114 X115 as to "say." For it is impossible to "say" if one does not "utter," and (Orpheus) deemed "say" and "utter" the same thing. "Say" and "teach" have the same sense; for it is impossible to "teach" without saying whatever is taught by means of words, and "teaching" is deemed to be a kind of "saying." So "teach" was not distinguished116 from "say," and "say" (was not distinguished) from "utter," but "utter," "say," and "teach" have the same sense. Thus there is nothing to stop "voicing all things" from meaning the same as "teaching all things." When Orpheus terms (Night)117 "nurse" he is hinting that, whatever (elements) the sun warms and dissolves, night cools and solidifies them... whatever (elements) the sun warmed ... "Olympus" is the same thing as "time." But those who suppose that "Olympus" is the same thing as "sky" are quite mistaken, as they do not comprehend that it is impossible for "sky" to be "longer" (rather) than "broader." But if someone termed time "long," he would not be at all mistaken. Wherever (Orpheus) intended to say "sky," he added the epithet122 "broad," but wherever (he meant) "time" (he did) the opposite, since he never (added the epithet) "broad," but "long." By saying that (Olympus) is "snowy," he used the (This verse proves that Zeus) XVII140 existed before he was named; then he was named. For Air was pre-existent141 even before those things which now exist were put together, and he142 will always exist; for he did not come to be, but existed. Why (Zeus) was called "Air" has been revealed earlier (in this treatise). But he was believed to have come to be because he was named "Zeus," as if he had not existed before. (Orpheus) said that (Air) would be "last" because he was named "Zeus," and this will continue to be his name so long as143 the things which now exist have been put together in the same element in which they were suspended when they were pre-existent. (Orpheus) is stating that the things which exist became such as they are on account of (Air), and, having come to be, are all in (Air 142. "He" is Air, who is also Mind and Zeus. The translator's dilemma in choosing between "he" and "it" well illustrates how the writer's account of the universe is at once theist and materialist.
Xapitp6[T]n.Ta (col. XXV 1). a indicates, at least where I could refer to an image, a letter that is damaged in such a way that it could be read as another,'a' an insertion above the line, [[a]] a deletion by the scribe, [a] a
143. p?tpt must mean "so long as." Understanding it as "until," Laks and Most translate "this continued to be its name until the things that are now were set together into the same form in which they were floating as they were before." This requires that itaTeXLt be emended to a preterite. I take it as future, a form well known in both Attic and Ionic. Since Air is the place in which everything exists, EfiOS needs to be taken as "element" and eiS as a lative expression for the place where the elements coalesced, i.e., in the Air, where they had floated before they coalesced. initiated) by someone who makes a profession of the rites157 are worthy of amazement and pity: amazement because, although they suppose, before they perform the rite, that they will have knowledge, after they have performed it they go away without gaining knowledge, and make no further inquiries, as if they knew something about what they saw, heard, or learned; and pity because it does not suffice them that they have wasted the fee that they paid beforehand, but they also go away bereft of their judgment too.158 Before performing the rites, they expect159 to have knowledge; after they have performed them, they go away bereft even of their expectation.
To one who hears the verses (?), the story appears (to say) that Zeus (had intercourse) with his own daughter160 (? 160. For the missing feminine noun I suggest "daughter." The author turns his attention to the scandal that, in Orpheus' poem, which was used for initiations into the Orphic mysteries of Dionysus, the poet makes Zeus commit polygamy and incest. For Zeus rapes his own mother Rhea (who bears Demeter), and then his sister-daughter Demeter (with Persephone as the result), and then perhaps his daughter Persephone (to beget Dionysus). Zeus' rape of his mother was narrated later in the poem, as col. XXVI shows; the birth of Demeter, the fruit of this union, evidently followed, according to a forward-reference at col. XXII 12-14, a passage that may also indicate that her subsequent rape was described in it.
161 165. I.e., has sexual intercourse, like a male animal. 0opv(6)ti entails an unattested active of 06pvuitat, which appears soon after; the fact that it scans as a cretic can be explained if -rt was shortened by epic reveals that (the elements), divided into little bits, moved and "mounted" in the Air, and by "mounting" were put together with each other. They kept "mounting" until the point when each had come to its like. "Heavenly Aphrodite," "Zeus," "aphrodize," "mount," "Persuasion," and "Harmony" are conventional names for the same God. A man uniting sexually with a woman is said to "aphrodize," as the saying goes. For when the things that now exist were united with each other, (God) was named "Aphrodite." (He was named) "Persuasion" because the things that exist "gave way" to each other; "to give way" is the same thing as "to persuade." (He was named) "Harmony" because he fitted together (hermose) many (elements) to each of the things that exist; for they had existed even before, but were named as "coming to be" after they had been separated. The fact of their separation reveals that... governs, so that... now... before it surpasses them. But (Orpheus) does not mean this when he states177 that it "shows"; for had he meant this, he would not have stated that it "shows for many" but "for all" at once, both178 for those who farm the land and for sailors, ( 
